

Message Text

SECRET

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66

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 EUR-25 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20 OIC-04 IO-14 AEC-11 OMB-01

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R 291520Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 344

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T BRUSSELS 1924

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, BE

SUBJECT: BELGIAN VIEWS ON MBFR

1. SUMMARY. DISCUSSION WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE BELGIAN OFFICIAL REVEALS CONVICTION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE INCLUDED IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO EAST, AND FIRM BELGIAN RESISTANCE TO IDEA OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS. THESE AND OTHER VIEWS REPORTED BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBOFF HAD GENERAL DISCUSSION MARCH 27 ON MBFR WITH MEMBER OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S CABINET RESPONSIBLE FOR FOLLOWING AND SECRET

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REPORTING TO THE MINISTER ON EAST-WEST AFFAIRS (CHAMPENOIS).

WHILE A NEW SOURCE, CHAMPENOIS EXHIBITED A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF MBFR AND SEEMED TO SPEAK WITH SOME AUTHORITY WHEN EXPRESSING THE FOLLOWING VIEWS.

2. CHAMPENOIS SAID THAT "WE BELIEVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE INCLUDED" IF THE WEST DESIRES SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE, COMMON CEILING PROPOSAL. HE STIPULATED THAT THIS BELGIAN VIEW CONTEMPLATES ONLY THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS INTO MBFR AND NOT THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY. HE ECHOED BELGIAN MBFR REP ADRIAENSSEN'S EARLIER STATEMENT THAT PERSHING MISSILES ARE EXPENDABLE (BRUSSELS 538) AND ADDED THAT BELGIUM'S F-104G AIRCRAFT HAVE A DUAL MISSION AND WOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE EVEN WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NEITHER EMBOFF NOR CHAMPENOIS REFERRED TO REPORTED BELGIAN EXAMINATION OF NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF MBFR (USNATO 1624), BUT CHAMPENOIS DEFINITELY GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS STATING A CONSIDERED BELGIAN VIEW.

3. OUR SOURCE STATED FLATLY THAT BELGIUM COULD NEVER AGREE TO SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS, EVEN IF SUCH REDUCTIONS WERE LIMITED TO ONE PERCENT OF THE FORCES AFFECTED. HE SAID THAT SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS OF THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT MBFR PARTICIPANTS WOULD IMPLY NATIONAL CEILINGS. THIS, HE ADDED, WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. CHAMPENOIS ADDED THAT BELGIUM WOULD PERHAPS ACCEPT A GLOBAL FORCE LIMITATIONS AGREEMENT, WITH A TIME LIMIT, AS PART OF PHASE ONE ARRANGEMENTS, BUT HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WOULD FIND THIS INADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN COMMON CEILING IDEA.

4. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE RECENT SOVIET EMBASSY DEMARCHE ON SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS (USNATO 1636), CHAMPENOIS SAID THERE WAS NOTHING TO ADD TO THE REPORT BELGIUM HAD MADE IN NATO AND LABELED PERFILIEV'S APPROACH AS A TYPICAL SOVIET TACTIC INTENDED TO SOW CONFUSION AMONG ALLIES. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE REMARKED THAT BELGIUM IS A FAVORITE SOVIET TARGET BECAUSE OF THE ROLE THAT BELGIUM HAS PLAYED HISTORICALLY IN SEEKING EAST-WEST DETENTE.

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5. CHAMPENOIS SAID THE MINISTRY HAD RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION FROM REPORTS FROM THE BELGIAN MBFR REP THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE SOVIET SYMBOLIC REDUCTION SCHEME. HE ADDED THAT HE NOW UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US HAD AGREED TO MODIFY A CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS PAPER ON THE SUBJECT IN A WAY THAT WOULD ELIMINATE ANY SUCH IMPLICATION.

6. CHAMPENOIS EXPRESSED CURIOSITY ABOUT WHETHER THE SECRETARY WOULD BE DISCUSSING MBFR DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT, TO WHICH EMBOFF REPLIED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD BE BRIEFED ON THE TALKS ON MARCH 29. CHAMPENOIS ALSO PROBED EMBOFF ON WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BEHIND THE RECENT US-UK-FRG TRILATERALS. EMBOFF DREW ON STATE 57192 AND 57521 IN RESPONDING. STRAUSSZ-HUPE

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NNN

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